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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

:

Case No. 920252-CA

DONALD WAYNE BUTCHER,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of burglary, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Was the evidence of defendant's intent to commit a theft once
he had unlawfully entered the Bradshaw home sufficient to support
his conviction for burglary?
This Court will not overturn a trial court's verdict unless it
is clearly erroneous. This standard "requires that if the findings
(or the trial court's verdict in a criminal case) are against the
clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made, the findings (or verdict) will be set aside."
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).

State v.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-202 (1990), governing the crime of
burglary, provides:
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or
any portion of a building with intent to
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault
on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in
which event it is a felony of the second
degree.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Following a bench trial on December 30, 1991, defendant was
convicted of burglary, a second degree felony (T. 52 or addendum
A).

After

a

60-day

evaluation,

he

was

sentenced

to

an

indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. The
court also levied a fine of $5000 and a surcharge of $1250 (R. 29
or addendum B). On appeal, defendant asserts that the evidence of
his intent to commit a theft, a necessary element of this burglary,
was insufficient to support his conviction for burglary.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 10, 1991, just before noon, Vicki Bradshaw was home
alone in a half-basement living space, talking with her mother on
the telephone (T. 18-19). Looking out through sliding glass doors
into her backyard, she saw a man, later identified as defendant,
"just sort of tiptoeing" (T. 21). She told her mother she "had to
go," hung up the phone, and then immediately dialed 911. She took
the telephone, hid behind a "great big couch chair" in the corner
of the room, and continued to watch out the sliding glass doors,
2

describing what she was observing to the dispatcher (T. 22).
Defendant checked the sliding glass doors, discovered they
were unlocked, and then closed the doors again.

Mrs. Bradshaw

testified that defendant then went out of her line of vision, but
that she heard him open and close a door in the garage.

She then

observed him peek in a large window by the front door and peek in
the door itself (T. 23). l She also heard him check the door, which
was locked (T. 24).
Defendant returned to the sliding glass doors, opened both of
them,

stepped

inside, and

testified: "And just then a

closed

the doors.

reflection —

Mrs. Bradshaw

he just looked out and

turned around and opened the door and ran like heck" (T. 25).
According to Mrs. Bradshaw, defendant ran from the premises
just as the police arrived. She, and apparently defendant as well,
had seen the reflection of the arriving police cars in the windows
(T. 25). Mrs.

Bradshaw

watched

defendant

jump

the

fence

surrounding her property and flee through an adjoining pasture.
The police apprehended him soon thereafter.
The police officer who read defendant his Miranda rights
testified that defendant told him he had been looking for water in
the Bradshaw backyard.
water

faucets were

Mrs. Bradshaw testified that functional

located

"all around

the house"

(T. 31),

including one "right by the door where [defendant] came in" (T.
30).

The police recovered a half-full plastic water bottle just

1

Mrs. Bradshaw's
hiding place was apparently only about
three feet away from the front door (T. 23).
3

outside the Bradshaw fence that defendant said belonged to him (T.
48).

Defendant also told the officer that he couldn't remember if

he had entered the residence because he had been drunk for the last
month and that "I might have been looking for alcohol" (T. 47).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence of defendant's intent to commit a theft may be
inferred from defendant's conduct or the surrounding circumstances.
In this case, although defendant claimed he was looking for water,
he already had a gallon jug half full of water, and there was a
functional water faucet located outside by the door where defendant
entered the home.

In addition, defendant checked the doors and

windows prior to entering, presumably to assure himself that no one
was at home. The trial court reasonably concluded that, under such
circumstances, defendant's behavior indicated that, once inside, he
intended "to commit a theft of some kind" (T. 51).

Because the

court's verdict was not clearly erroneous, defendant's conviction
should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS AMPLY
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S INTENT TO
COMMIT A THEFT INSIDE THE BRADSHAW HOME.
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
"Intent may be inferred from the actions of the defendant or
from the surrounding circumstances."
555, 558 (Utah 1985).
actually taken."

State v. Isaacson. 704 P.2d

This holds true "even though nothing is

State v. Tellav, 324 P.2d 490, 490-91 (Utah
4

1958).

Indeed,

,f

[t]he

fact

that

nothing

was

missing

when

[defendant] was apprehended is no defense to the burglary charge,
nor does it destroy the inference of intent to steal at the time of
entry."

State v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1985) (citing

State v. Sisneros, 631 P,2d 856 (Utah 1981)).
In this case, the court made two specific findings from which
defendant's intent to commit a theft may be inferred.

The

findings are based on testimony from the woman who witnessed the
entire event, statements defendant made to the police officer who
read him his Miranda rights, and evidence found at the site (R. 512 or addendum A ) .
First, defendant explained his presence by telling a police
officer that "he had been looking for water in the backyard" (T.
47).

Indeed, defendant claimed that a gallon water jug found by

officers just outside the Bradshaw fence belonged to him. The jug,
however, was half-full of water at the time, and Mrs. Bradshaw
testified that not only were there functional water faucets located
around the perimeter of the house, but also that there was one
located "right by the door where [defendant] came in" (T. 30). In
ruling out defendant's claimed purpose of obtaining water, the
court stated: "If he had wanted water, of course, he already had a
half gallon of water.

If he wanted more, he could have filled it

up from the outside" (T. 51-2).
Second, prior to entering the home, defendant checked the
sliding

glass

doors, the

garage

additionally, peeked in the window.
5

door,

the

front

door

and,

The court understood these

actions as defendant's way of assuring himself that no one was home
prior to entering the dwelling (T. 52).
Looking at the uncontroverted testimony of the witness to the
event, defendant's statements to the police officer, the presence
of outdoor water faucets at the home, and the water jug found at
the site, the court reasonably inferred: "So his purpose in going
in was to commit a theft of some kind" (T. 52).

Because the

finding of intent to commit a theft can be easily inferred from
defendant's actions or the surrounding circumstances, defendant's
conviction for burglary should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Evidence of defendant's intent to commit a theft once he had
unlawfully entered the Bradshaw home was sufficient to support his
conviction for burglary.

The decision of the trial court should,

therefore, be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this I

day of December, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Michael D. Murphy, Attorney for Defendant, 93 S. Main Street Suite
4, Kaysville, Utah

84037, this 2

day of December, 1992.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

1 I whether he might have been in the home?
2

A

3

to why he was in the home.

4
5
6

He made some other references, but not specifically

MR. HARWARD:
J

I have no other questions.

MR. ALBRIGHT:

I have nothing of this witness, your

Honor.

7

THE COURT:

You may step down.

8

MR. HARWARD:

9

MR. ALBRIGHT:

Thank you.

State rests.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. HARWARD:

12

MR. ALBRIGHT:

13

THE COURT:

Defense would rest, your Honor.

Closing argument?
No. We're willing to submit it.
Submit it.

It appears clear from the testimony given

14

before the Court that on October 10th, 1991, at Woods Cross

15

at the home of Vicki Bradshaw, 1017 West 1050 South in Woods

16

Cross, that the defendant in the courtroom having been

17

identified did, in fact, enter that residence.

18

elements of the offense is that it be done with the intent to

19

commit a theft or commit some other crime.

20

one alleges with an intent to commit theft.

21

One of the

This particular

He indicated to the officer that he entered for the

22

purpose of getting water.

23

water taps on the outside, also that he had a water bottle,

24

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, half full of water at the time. A

25

gallon jug half full of water.

3{tllu

It's been testified that there was

If he had wanted water, of

UBiourn cHicdzn Court Reporter
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2

more, he could have filled it up from the outside.

3

And so the Court cannot find that there was any

4

other purpose in entering the residence, he having apparently

5

satisfactorily assured himself that there was no one inside

6

the residence since Vicki Bradshaw was concealing herself

7

from where he could see her.

8

to commit a theft of some kind.

9

That the officers arrived before he could commit a

10

theft.

11

degree.

12
13
14

So his purpose in going in was

Clearly he's guilty of burglary, a felony of a second
The Court will so find.
We'd like to set it for sentencing.

Is that

agreeable, counsel?
MR. ALBRIGHT:

Your Honor, if I may, I've talked with

15

Mr. Butcher about sentencing.

And we would waive time. And

16

I have discussed this with Mr. Harward as well, and that is

17

that 60-day evaluation would be appropriate.

18

the past has had a 90-day evaluation.

Mr. Butcher in

19

THE COURT:

How long ago.

20

MR. ALBRIGHT:

21

MR. BUTCHER:

22

MR. ALBRIGHT:

23

THE COURT: Was that at the state prison?

24

MR. ALBRIGHT:

25

THE COURT:

I think it was about two or three years.
Four years it's been.
Four years ago.

So it's been some time.

Yes,; it was.

And what was that for?

D(d[ij

!B\oum cHlcktn

What were you

Court Reporter
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL "DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS*,' STATE ^ F /folfifo

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT
TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON

vs.
DONALD WAYNE BUTCHER,
Defendant.

Case No. 911707459

That whereas said defendant, having plead guilty to
the crime of burglary, a felony of the second degree, and now
being present in Court accompanied by his attorney and ready for
sentence, thereupon the Court renders its judgment.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
The defendant is sentenced to the Utah State Prison
for an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years and fined $5,000 plus a
surcharge of $1,250.
Dated this 17th day of March, 1992, with the Seal of
the Court affixed hereto.

PAULA CARR
ClerX of Court

By.
:hy PotQts
Kathy
''Hiww^

i

' i »
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